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THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
TRANS FORMATIVE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES:
A KIERKEGAARDIAN EXPLORATION
C. Stephen Evans

This paper attempts to explore the notion that some religious experiences
may have value in justifying or making religious belief rational without those
experiences being considered as evidence. Rather, the epistemological value
of the experiences is seen as transforming the individual to make it possible
for the person to gain religious knowledge, either by giving the person skills
or abilities needed properly to consider other evidence, or by activating some
basic belief-forming disposition. The distinction Alvin Plantinga draws between evidence and ground provides an initial starting point for considering
the significance of such experiences. Kierkegaard's analysis of the experience
of encountering God in Christ is then explored as a concrete illustration of
the possibilities of transformative religious experience.
Most of the epistemological attention given to religious experience in the
philosophy of religion centers on the evidential value of such experience. Of
course philosophers are aware that religious experiences may have value in
other respects. That is, religious experience may produce more saintly lives,
give the experiencer a sense of peace and tranquility, and so on, and these
fruits of the experience may far exceed in value any epistemological value.
Nonetheless, insofar as religious experience is thought to have any value for
the project of showing that religious convictions are rationally justifiable, or
amount to knowledge, it has often been thought that such experiences must
be conceived as providing evidence. Even the non-epistemological fruits of
the experiences may have some epistemological weight, but only if one can
somehow show that they amount to evidence. For example, one might try to
show that an experience which led to more saintly living was more likely to
be veridical.
I wish to explore the notion that what I shall call the transformative character of religious experience has epistemological value in its own right, independently of any consideration of the evidential value of such experiences.
Not every religious experience has this transformative character. Those experiences which do are those which lead to a significant change in the personality of the experiencer, including changes in such things as emotions,
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attitudes, skills, and belief-structures. 'lYpical examples of transformative
religious experiences would include the following kinds of cases:
(1) A young adolescent who has been burdened with feelings of guilt comes
forward at the close of an evangelistic meeting to give his life to Christ.
Afterwards he feels much less guilty, and has a new sense of zest and purpose
much of the time. (2) A young person who has been practicing Zen suddenly
feels that she has come to understand the key to peace and wholeness. She
is unable to explain to others how to achieve a similar state, but she has
gained a serenity and relief from certain types of questions and worries which
formerly plagued her. (3) A middle-aged executive who is exhausted by his
responsibilities has an experience of oneness with nature while on a walk in
the woods. He feels a deep kinship with all that is around him, and gains a
new perspective on the importance, or lack thereof, of his daily tasks.

1. Plantinga's Distinction Between Evidence and Ground
One philosopher who has recently explored the way religious experience
might have epistemological value which is obscured by treating it as evidence
is Alvin Plantinga. In the course of defending the claim that belief in God
may be properly basic for some people, Planting a has made a distinction
between evidence for a belief and a ground for a belief. I If one claims, as
Plantinga does, that for some people belief in God may be "properly basic,"
reasonable but not based on any evidence for the belief, then it might appear
that one has opened the floodgates for nonsense. Doesn't this mean that any
belief, say the belief of Linus in the Great Pumpkin, could be properly basic?
In such a situation it appears that which beliefs are properly basic will be
highly arbitrary. Plantinga argues that this is not so. Properly basic beliefs may
be grounded in certain experiences, even if those experiences are not evidence
for the beliefs in question. 2 Such experiences therefore playa role in justifying
the belief, without being evidence. When I see a tree I believe there is a tree in
front of me. On Plantinga's view, this belief may be basic; it is not something
I hold on the basis of any other beliefs I have. Nevertheless, the belief is
not arbitrary, and the experience plays a role in its justification.
Some have objected that such an experience can be considered evidence after
all. In one sense this objection is perfectly correct. Plantinga is clearly operating
with a conception of evidence as something that is propositional in character,
and which has some logical relation to what it is supposed to be evidence for.
Since an experience of being-appeared-treely-to is not a proposition, for
Plantinga it does not count as evidence. There are other ways of construing the
concept of evidence on which such experiences might be said to be evidence.
That is, there is an older concept of "evidence," which does not restrict evidence
to propositions, but regards anything that can make a belief more "evident" as
evidence. On such a view of evidence, it could be argued that we do have
evidence for those beliefs that Plantinga regards as basic.
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To take this objection as decisive, however, is to obscure what is really
interesting and original in Plantinga's proposal. I do not think that Plantinga
is denying that it is possible to consider such experiences as evidence, given
certain concepts of evidence. Indeed, perhaps it is possible for the experiences
to provide evidence for the beliefs for some people, even on Plantinga's
concept of evidence. At least many philosophers have attempted to show how
experiences of trees can be said to constitute sufficient evidence for belief in
trees. Rather, Plantinga is suggesting that the experiences do not have to be
construed in this way.
One might, for example, see belief in the tree as an immediate result of a
natural disposition. When human beings are appeared to in the appropriate
way, they simply believe in the tree without any considerations of evidence
and argument. They may have evidence for their belief in some sense of the
term, but they do not consciously arrive at the belief on the basis of any other
beliefs or data. Rather, they simply have the experience and form the relevant
belief. Perhaps some of our basic beliefs are properly formed through such
dispositions. To return from the example of the tree to the philosophy of
religion, Plantinga says that the difference between a basic belief in the Great
Pumpkin and a basic belief in God is that God has implanted in us human
beings "a natural tendency to see his hand in the world around US."3 This
suffices to distinguish the two cases, "there being no Great Pumpkin and no
natural tendency to accept beliefs about the Great Pumpkin."4 That of course
does not mean that there could not exist a sincere believer in the Great
Pumpkin who treats his belief as properly basic; it simply means such a
believer would be deluded, if Plantinga is correct in his assertions.
So for Plantinga a person contemplating a flower or the vastness of the
universe might properly be led by the experience to believe in God. Of course
the flower or the uni verse could be construed as evidence for God's existence,
but must they be so construed? Could we not also see them as activating a
natural disposition, occasioning the operation of what one might term a reliable, belief-forming mechanism? The point is that thinking of the experience
solely as evidence obscures one important function of the experience, namely
that it produces changes in the subject of the experience. These changes may
have epistemological significance of a type which is missed when we focus
solely on the concept of evidence.
In Plantinga's own examples, the experience seems mostly to provide the
input to this belief-forming disposition or mechanism. Thus, the transformation in the subject does not seem to be highly significant, but is simply the
kind of change a person undergoes in having a new experience. However, it
seems completely consistent with Plantinga's position to regard the experience as changing the subject in more radical ways. For example, one might
view the experience as facilitating the operation of the mechanism, or as
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eliminating a barrier to its operation. Given the fact that the belief-producing
mechanisms Plantinga discusses do not seem to be universally shared in their
operation, seeing experiences as transformative in this manner would appear
not only to be consistent with Plantinga's position, but as strengthening it. It
would do this by giving one potential explanation for a difference between
the universality which seems to attach to many of our belief-producing mechanisms, such as sense perception, and the mechanism that is alleged to produce belief in God.

2. The Role of Subjectivity in Acquiring Religious Knowledge
The reason it is important to look more closely at transformative religious
experiences is that it forces us to look more closely at the role of subjectivity
in the acquisition of religious knowledge. Even in cases where religious
beliefs are founded on objective evidence, it is clear that subjectivity does
play such a role. It is not enough that there be evidence. The evidence must
be grasped, understood, weighed, or somehow enter into the life of the believer if it is to have any significance. Yet in order for this to occur the
believer must be capable of grasping, understanding, weighing, or perceiving
(or whatever else she must do) the evidence.
I think that the implicit assumption in many epistemological discussions in
the philosophy of religion is that this subjective dimension may be ignored.
Whatever abilities or skills that may be necessary to gain the necessary
evidence are assumed to be widely present or easily acquired. The real questions concern whether a proof is sound, or whether an experience constitutes
evidence; there is much less discussion of whether I might be capable of
discerning that a sound argument is sound, or perceiving that evidence is
good evidence. Yet this assumption, which tends to be an a priori one which
is not defended, looks dubious in light of actual religious traditions, which
often stress how difficult it is to become the kind of person one must become
to acquire religious truth. Years of meditation, ritual participation, or saintly,
sacrificial living are often said to be prerequisites for gaining at least the
higher forms of religious knowledge. The acquisition of moral and spiritual
character of a particular type is often alleged to be especially important.
The skeptic may rightly wonder whether such arduous personal training is
worth it. Don't I have a right to know that a religious perspective contains
truth before I spend valuable years of my life following its teachings? Such
an attitude may sometimes be reasonable, but, as Hegel and Kierkegaard often
remind us, it also may have its price. If one demands that one know how to
swim before going into the water, one will never learn to swim. It is worth
noting that the novice in almost all human fields of endeavor, including
science, must begin at least by taking many things on faith. As the aspiring
young scientist learns to use instruments, read scholarly papers, and decipher
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the significance of statistical data, his labor is based mostly on his faith that
the community of scientists which employs these methods knows what it is
doing. He may of course have'good reasons for his faith in this community,
but it is not immediately evident that the same could not be said for the
aspiring religious knower with respect to some religious communities.
There are philosophers who have given at least brief attention to what might
be termed the "subjective requirements" for attaining religious knowledge.
One who has taken some notice of the role of subjectivity in acquiring religious knowledge is George Mavrodes. In his book Belief in God, Mavrodes
points out that many of our significant epistemological concepts are "personrelative. "5 To say that a proposition is known is to say that it is known by
someone. If we say that to qualify as a proof, an argument must not only be
logically sound, but must be capable of being known to be sound, and if we
recognize that a person must be able to know the premises of a proof in order
to determine that the proof is sound, then it is easy to see that even the
seemingly objective concept of "proof' has a heavy subjective component.
An argument may well constitute a proof to one individual and not to another.
Ma vrodes does not really develop this theme in Belief in God, which is a very
brief book, but the point is nevertheless significant, and cries out for further
elaboration.
William Alston, in his work on religious experience, has also noted the
importance of subjective requirements for religious knowledge. For example,
in "Religious Experience and Religious Belief," he regards the following
proposition as plausible: "God has decreed that a human being will be aware
of His presence in any clear and unmistakable fashion only when certain
special and difficult conditions are satisfied."6 Alston obviously thinks that
some of those conditions are subjective, since he goes on to say that "it is a
basic theme in Christianity, and in other religions as well, that one finds God
within one's experience, to any considerable degree, only as one progresses
in the spiritual life. God is not available for voyeurs. "7 Though this theme is
once again undeveloped in this article, these comments are very suggestive.
Given these considerations, which seem to me to be obvious, practically
platitudinous, God may well have had an effective response to Bertrand
Russell, should the latter actually have had the chance to give his famous
complaint to God, if he did, much to his surprise, encounter God after his
death. Russell is frequently quoted as saying that in such a situation, if queried
about his own unbelief, he should simply say to God, "Not enough evidence."
If Russell did deliver this line, perhaps God responded by asking Russell if
he had assiduously worked at becoming the kind of person who could have
recognized the evidence God had actually provided.
If one asks exactly how subjective transformations in the individual might
make religious knowledge possible, at least two general types of answers are
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possible. Each type of answer reflects a characteristic underlying epistemological perspecti ve. One line of response, which we might term the evidentialist view, sees the role of subjectivity as enabling the individual to properly
grasp or receive objective evidence. Many particular versions of this type of
view are possible, depending on the different kinds of evidence which are
thought to be decisive, the different ways that evidence is thought to be
apprehended, the different subjective qualities which are thought to be essential to apprehend the evidence, and the different ways those qualities are
believed to be acquired or developed.
The second possible response is the one which I suggested at the end of
section (1) would be a natural extension of Plantinga's approach. Here the
subjective quality is seen, not as making it possible for the individual to
apprehend evidence, but as facilitating the operation, or perhaps eliminating
a barrier to the operation, of some natural, belief-producing disposition or
mechanism in the individual. Obviously, here again a great variety of specific
views are possible, depending on the nature of the dispositions in question
and their conditions of actualization.
Though I have complimented Plantinga for directing attention to the nonevidential value of religious experiences, I think it is fair to say that he can
be faulted for failing, at least up to this point, to explore the specific character
of such experiences. He does imply that such an exploration would be worthwhile: "There are therefore many conditions and circumstances that call forth
belief in God: guilt, gratitude, danger, a sense of God's presence, a sense that
he speaks, perception of various parts of the universe. A complete job would
explore the phenomenology of all these conditions and of more besides."8 It
seems to me that this kind of phenomenological exploration is crucial if the
account of religious knowledge Plantinga gives is to appear more than a
dogmatic one. The skeptic will naturally be suspicious of any talk about
natural belief-producing dispositions in this case, and curious about why they
seem to operate in some circumstances and not in others. Only a concrete
account of how the mechanisms are supposed to operate is likely to be helpful
in response to such worries, but such an account will certainly have to analyze
the subjective conditions which mediate the operation of the alleged mechanisms.

3. Kierkegaard's Account of Faith as the Result of
an Encounter with the Incarnation
I should like, in the remainder of this paper, to try to give an example of
the kind of phenomenological account Plantinga needs to fill out his account.
The example I shall employ is the account of faith given by Kierkegaard (or
his pseudonym Johannes Climacus-I shaH not here tackle the problem of
pseudonymity9). The example is chosen for several reasons. One is that the
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object of religious knowledge in this case is God conceived in the form of a
particular historical figure; this is more challenging than mere belief in God.
A second is that the object of religious knowledge in this case more closely
approximates the actual content of a living religion. In addition, I have in a
previous paper said some things about the relevance of Kierkegaard's account
of subjectivity for Plantinga's view of belief in God.1O
The view of Kierkegaard which underlies the account I shall give differs in
many respects from the usual picture. Though I believe that the view of
Kierkegaard which I offer is correct, I shall make little attempt to argue that here,
though I have done so elsewhere. I I In this context, if I am wrong in my view
of Kierkegaard, it makes no difference, since the position is offered only as
a possibility which illustrates a way of conceiving of religious experience.
It is well known that Kierkegaard, in Philosophical Fragments, as well as
other works, describes Christian faith as faith in the incarnation conceived
as "the absolute paradox." Such a faith is supposed to be "against the understanding," and in fact it presents the potential believer with "the possibility
of offense." This faith is only acquired by the believer in an act of will, often
referred to as "the leap." This is not, however, an act of will which the
individual can carry out by her own power. It can be accomplished only when
the individual receives "the condition," which is the result of a first-person
encounter with the God who has appeared in history. 12
These claims are often interpreted along the following lines. The paradox
is understood as a logical contradiction, which naturally enough can only be
viewed rationally as an impossible event. One can acquire faith in such a
thing only if God supernaturally alters the will so as to make it possible for
the individual to choose to believe something which reason must reject as
impossible. If a person wills to put reason aside, then faith is a possibility,
and she will avoid being offended. 13
On my reading of Kierkegaard, this interpretation is almost completely
wrong. I will try to briefly sketch an alternative. 14 Suppose that the incarnation is not a logical contradiction, but is rather a mystery, something that is
truly above reason. If reason insists on trying to understand the incarnation,
it falls into contradictions. One could say that the incarnation is an apparent
contradiction, at least to a person determined to understand it. It is against
reason only when reason insists that there is nothing which cannot be understood by reason.
Why is the incarnation a paradox, an apparent contradiction? On the view
I am rejecting, it is because the incarnation requires that we believe that God,
who is essentially eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on, has become
non-eternal, limited in knowledge and power, and so forth. On the alternative
view I am sketching, these contradictions are at most apparent, because to
claim they are real contradictions is to presuppose that we have reliable
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knowledge as to what God's nature is. We can only know that a round square
is a contradictory concept if we have a clear understanding of what it means
to be round and what it means to be square. Similarly, we can only know that
the concept of the God-man is contradictory if we have a clear understanding
of what it means to be God and to be a human being.
Suppose that we lack such knowledge, and that the purpose of the incarnation is to remedy this defect by giving us reliable information about God.
In such a case, it is reasonable to think that the new insight about God would
contradict at least some of our previous pseudo-knowledge of what God was
like. Thus, paradoxicalness is what one would expect in a genuine revelation
from God, and the fact that the incarnation is an apparent contradiction is not
decisive evidence that it is a logical contradiction.
The incarnation is a paradox to us because of "the absolute difference between
God and man."i5 On my alternative, this difference is not primarily a metaphysical difference, but a spiritual, moral one. "What then is the difference?" asks
Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Fragments. "Indeed, what else
but sin," is the clear answer. i6 There is a natural tension between human reason
and the paradox, but that tension stems from the fact that human reasoning is
carried on by sinful human beings. That sinfulness supports a negative reaction
to the paradox in part because sin represents an attitude of prideful rebellion and
autonomy. A mystery which is above reason is an insult to our pretensions of
self-sufficiency and will naturally be resented as such.
Even more significant, however, is the fact that the incarnation is an act of
a completely unselfish, loving God. Our human thinking is limited by our
human experience, which is always tainted by our own selfishness. We would
have enough trouble believing that a human being had abandoned some high
position for the sake of a lesser person. Imagine that a king were to give up
his throne for the sake of the love of a young woman. Even in such a case
we would be inclined to be cynical, to impute hidden, selfish motives, and if
we could not find such motives, we might be skeptical that the act took place
at all. i? Since the difference between a king and a commoner is a jest in
comparison with the difference between God and an ordinary human person,
it is no surprise that we find the idea of the incarnation the "most unlikely
event possible. "i8 It goes against all our ordinary standards of probability,
founded as they are in our experience, which is bereft of any genuinely
unselfish actions.
With this alternative reading of what Kierkegaard means by the paradox,
we are now ready to examine an alternative understanding of faith and the
leap, one which will allow a decisive role for a transformative religious
experience. Kierkegaard insists that faith is not something that can be understood as a natural capacity of a human being, but must be received as a gift
from God when we encounter God incarnate. We are told repeatedly that faith
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is a condition which "the god himself must provide," and that it can only be
provided through a first-hand encounter. 19 On my reading this first-hand
encounter is crucial because it is a transformative religious experience. The
encounter does not so much provide evidence for the reality of the incarnation
but rather changes the person to make it possible for her to become a believer.
How does this occur? Various accounts are possible, but one which I find
plausible lays stress on the fact that the encounter is an experience of the
love of God. It is well known that being loved can produce significant
changes in people. Psychologists say that all kinds of problems result when
children do not gain a sense that they are loved by their parents. An experience of absolute, unconditional love could conceivably so transform a person
that her embedded conviction that unselfish love was impossible might be
shaken. Such an experience might be enough to shatter a person's whole
structure of attitudes and beliefs. Instead of judging, on the basis of my
standards of what is likely and unlikely, that the incarnation is impossible, I
might come to question those evidential standards themselves.
What role is there for the will to play on this view? It is clear enough why
Kierkegaard should insist that faith is not simply the result of an act of will
on the part of the believer, since it is made possible by what God gives to
the believer. 2o There is still room for will to playa role, however. The role
is not, as many have supposed, to get myself to believe something I know
isn't true; thus the popular conception of Kierkegaard 's leap of faith as a kind
of manipulation of my belief structure is completely wrong. Rather, what I
must will to achieve is an openness to having my natural attitude of self-sufficiency and selfishness overturned. In the encounter with the God, love is
offered but not forced. The person who insists on autonomy will find such
an encounter painful, since it is humbling to discover that there are mysteries
one cannot understand, and even more painful to discover what true love is
like, when this discovery means I discover how unloving I am at the same
time. The encounter with love makes it possible for the individual to put aside
one's pride and achieve the humility of faith, but an act of will on the part
of the individual is necessary as well. 21
Such an encounter with an incarnate God could, I believe, function in either
of the two ways I sketched in section (2). That is, one can imagine the ex perience
as providing the occasion for the creation of a Plantinga-style basic belief, or as
providing a new perspective on evidence for the belief, evidence which was
perhaps there all along, but which the individual was previously unable to appreciate. The first option clearly seems to be the one preferred by Kierkegaard.
The following account of an experience, which comes from Anthony Bloom, a
Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church, who was transformed from a
militant atheist to a believer, might serve to illustrate Kierkegaard's view of
the way faith comes into being in an individual:
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While I was reading the beginning of St. Mark's Gospel, before I reached
the third chapter, I suddenly became aware that on the other side of my desk
there was a presence. And the certainty was so strong that it was Christ
standing there that it has never left me. This was the real turning point.
Because Christ was alive and I had been in his presence I could say with
certainty that what the Gospel said about the crucifixion of the prophet of
Galilee was true, and the centurion was right when he said, 'Truly he is the
Son of God.' It was in the light of the Resurrection that I could read with
certainty the story of the Gospel, knowing that everything was true in it
because the impossible event of the Resurrection was to me more certain than
any event of history. History I had to believe, the Resurrection I knew for a
fact. I did not discover, as you see, the Gospel beginning with its first message
of the Annunciation, and it did not unfold for me as a story which one can
believe or disbelieve. It began as an event that left all problems of disbelief
behind because it was a direct and personal experience. 22

This account may not seem Kierkegaardian in all respects, particularly in its
emphasis on the Resurrection, which Kierkegaard does not talk much about,
though it could be argued that the Resurrection is presupposed by
Kierkegaard's stress on a first-hand encounter with Christ. However, in essentials Bloom's account illustrates the points I wish to stress. The primary
notion is that faith is the result of a first-person encounter with Christ. In
Bloom's account, this encounter comes by means of an historical record,
rooted in the accounts of contemporaries and passed down from generation
to generation, but that record is merely the means. This is precisely the
formula Kierkegaard gives for the acquisition of faith: "The person who
comes later believes by means of (the occasion) the report of the contemporary, by the power of the condition he himself receives from the God."23
It is also clear in this account that Bloom's faith is basic for him in the way
Plantinga describes, yet it nevertheless clearly has a ground, namely the
experience. Bloom clearly does not decide to believe the historical account
as a result of evidence for its trustworthiness; rather he comes to evaluate the
historical trustworthiness of the account on the basis of his encounter with a
living Christ. Notice also the characteristic Kierkegaardian perspective on
faith as a certainty concerning something which from one perspective appears
absurd, or, in Bloom's words, impossible.
There is one noteworthy difference between this case and Plantinga's case
of a basic belief in God. Plantinga conceives the transformative experience
in his case as triggering a natural disposition. On the Kierkegaardian case,
where the basic belief is in the God in time, the disposition to believe must
be construed as something which is created in the individual in the experience, not as a natural capacity which simply was dormant. Thus on the
Kierkegaardian case the transformative experience is decisively important in
a way that is not the case for the Plantinga example. In Plantinga's example,
the experience is an occasion, but presumably other experiences could equally
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well serve as an occasion. His view is thus Socratic, in the language of
Fragments. The believer in the incarnation, however, cannot possibly view
her experience as merely an occasion, since the experience is one which
created the necessary disposition within her.
As noted above, though it may be unKierkegaardian, one could also construe the transformative experience, while not itself evidence, as making it
possible for the individual properly to consider and appreciate evidence for
the belief. Or, one could even construe the experience as functioning in two
different respects, as itself providing evidence and also as transforming the
individual to make it possible rightly to consider that evidence. This way of
construing the experience has the merit of explaining why believers often are
concerned with evidence or reasons for their faith, while at the same time
holding on to the Kierkegaardian insight that what is decisive is not the
evidence but the subjectivity of the individual who is viewing that evidence.
On this view, one cannot properly say that faith is opposed to reason, as
Kierkegaard so often does, but merely that it is opposed to the thinking
patterns of the unbeliever. On this perspective, reason itself is one of the
things changed by the transformative religious experience. Such a perspective
asks, in effect, why the standards of probability and evidence of the untransformed individual should own the title of "reason." Perhaps Kierkegaard,
in his zeal to protect Christianity against seIling its soul by altering its core
to make it palatable to contemporary society, was too quick to give away the
word "reason," a word many Christians have wished to reclaim and redeem.
In Kierkegaard's defense, however, we might consider the contributions of
contemporary sociologists of knowledge. It is important to recognize that
terms like "reason" and "knowledge" often function as instruments of control,
means by which those with social power attempt to legitimate their ways of
seeing the world and acting in it. If Kierkegaard is right in thinking that
human beings are in the grip of something like original sin, it is all too natural
that these sorts of words will necessarily carry with them a commitment to
anti-Christian ways of thinking. If that is so, then the attempt to justify
Christianity before its "cultured despisers" will likely be a betrayal of Christianity. Such defenses will tend to convert Christianity to Christendom, and
eliminate the possibility that an encounter with God in Christ will have, as
one of its outcomes, a prophetic critique of the social order.24
This extended discussion of a Kierkegaardian analysis of an experience of
the incarnation is not, of course, exhaustive of the possibilities of transformative religious experience. Indeed, the experience I have examined is probably not even typical. It does, however, deal with a type of experience which
has had surpassing importance to many people within the Christian tradition.
I hope that the exploration will show how fruitful such phenomenological
analysis can be, and that the consideration of transformative religious expe-
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rience raises many issues which are often overlooked or slighted in the philosophy of religion. Many more questions have been raised by this than
answered, but I do not think that there is much hope of answering such
questions without paying close attention to the specific character of the different forms of transformative religious experience. 25
St. Olaf College
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